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German-Chetnik relations and Serbian Nazi connection and collaboration

In this thread I´ll be posting exclusively German documents and a occasional quote from books written by Germans who served in Yugoslavia in WW2, both connected to the relations Wehrmacht had with Chetniks of Draza Mihailovic,a highly disputed matter.This will give a chance to a reader to have a clearer picture.The informations will be posted as they come to my hands,so the material here will unfortunately not be in chronological order. I´ll refrain from comments,but will allow myself puting emphasis on the parts I deem especially important. If you have similar documents,please post them.

Neither German nor English are my native languages,so if you spot some translation mistakes,feel free to correct me.

Quote:
July 13th, 1943The Abt.Fremde Heere West has informed GenStdH about the message of Gen.Mihailovic to his commanders dated July 7th in which he, in the light of Allied landings in Sicily ,calls for preparations for uprising to be made,but to attack on his signal only…

Percy Schramm (hrsg.) “Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht 1940-1945″,Bernard&Graefe Verlgag,Muenchen,1982 (later “KTB OKW”),Band 6/II,p.779

Quote:
July 20th,1943OB Suedost informs about a captured radio-message of Mihailovic dated July 16th in which he,in the light of lthe looming events,calls for Sabotage in Croatia and thrust to the Adriatic,so that the Allies find chetniks instead of communists there.To take the wind out of Tito´s sails,the propaganda is to be Yugoslav rather than Greater-Serbian

KTB OKW,b. 6/II,p.812

Quote:
August 30th,1943OKW has sent Führer´s decree dated August 28th over appointment of envoy Neubacher as “Sonderbevollmächtigten des Ausw. Amtes für den Südosten” as an addition to his existing tasks in the South-east.Appointment has already been forseen in a regulation concerning Befelsführung in the South-east.His official seat is to be in Belgrade.

KTB OKW,b.6/II,p.1036

Quote:
October 30th,1943On October 29th,Special envoy Neubacher has briefed the Führer on political and economical issues in the South-east,especially on Tito´s growing influence.On the same day an order was issued concerning the united effort in the struggle against communism in the South-east.The foreign ministry has despatched it on October 30th,with a request that all involved military posts are to be informed >”mit der Bitte um unterrichtung der beteiligten militärischen Stellen”<.Special envoy Neubacher,who receives his instructions from the Foreign minister,is charged with the political leadership in fight against Comunnism and with organisation of anti-communist nationalistic forces in the South-east.He is to take care that the political and economical measures are targeted against Communism.The ordering of reprisals is to be done in consultation with him. It is further instructed that the commanding powers are to be tightened in the person of Oberbefehlshaber of AG “F”. Sp.envoy Neubacher has also been granted special powers:among others, he has the authorisation to negotiate with nationalsitic bands,if the possibilty occurs.(Bands of Draza Mihailovic,which have partly been pushed back to Serbia by Tito,appear to be breaking up.)….

KTB OKW,b.6/II,p.1233

Quote:
November 5th,1943Serbia: Mihailovic strives for a national-Serbian army >”bemüht sich um…Armee”<.He waits for an outside impulse to take action.Because there is still no such impusle,his movement faces crisis.Opposite to him,Communism steadily gains influence;it pushed Mihailovic out of Croatia. Because of this,he seeks conntact with German posts. It is striven to dissuade him from actions against Germans;still,precaution has to be taken against blackmailing methods.Apart from that communist action aimed at dissolution of his forces has far advanced.

KTB OKW b.6/II,p.1252-1253

Quote:
November 7th,1943From the German point of view it is desirable that Tito changes the coast as his main objective.So far he has pushed back the Serbian chetniks.It is the question if these ,under the circumstances,can be won over for our side. Sp. envoy Neubacher is authorised for the negotiations.

KTB OKW b.6/II,p.1261

Quote:
November 17th,1943Proposals for arrangement with chetnik groups have been presented. At the moment,only single bands are involved,not Mihailovic personaly.

KTB OKW b.6/II,p.1289

Quote:
November 20th,1943The OB Südost sent an extract from an agreement signed between the Mil.Bef.Serbien and Cetnik Staff 148 on November 19th.

KTB OKW b.6/II,p.1294

Quote:
November 21st,1943The cease-fire agreement between German,Bulgarian and Serbian security forces on one side,and chetnik groups on Serbian-Montenegro border on the other side has been signed between Mil.Bef. Serbien and a high-ranking DM commander. The agreement,in which Mihailovic has not been involved ,should serve as a prerequisite for a joint fight against the communists.

KTB OKW b.6/II,p.1296

Here is the text of the agreement (scanned from J.Piekalkiewicz´s “Krieg auf dem Balkan 1940-1945″ and converted using ABBYY Scan-to-Office software):

Quote:
Geheime KommandosacheAuszug aus Vertrag zwischen Mil. Befehlshaber Südost und Cetnikstab 148, Führer Major Lukacevic, vom 19.11.43.

1.Waffenruhe im Raum Bajina Basta - Drin-Fluß -Tara-Fluß - Bijelopolje - Rozaj - Kos. Mitrovica -Ibar-Fluß - Kraljevo - Cacak - Uzice.
In Abkommen sind eingeschlossen Deutsche Wehrmacht und Polizei, Bulgarische Wehrmacht, SFK, SSW, RSK, serbische Behörden und Wirtschaftsbetriebe, auf Cetnikseite Cetnikverbände des Majors Lukacevic im genannten Gebiet.
2.Waffenruhe soll Voraussetzung für gemeinsamen Kampf gegen Kommunisten bilden.
3.Gemeinsamer propagandistischer Kampf gegen Kommunismus.
4.Bestätigung Lukacevic, daß in unterstellten Einheiten kein Angehöriger der mit Deutschland im Krieg befindlichen Mächte vorhanden.
5.Überlassung von Kampfräumen an Cetnikverbände zu selbständiger Kampfführung durch Deutsche Wehrmacht.
6.Eingliederung der Cetnikverbände in deutsche Kampfführung bei größeren gemeinsamen Operationen. Kampfaufträge für diese Zeit durch deutsche Führung an Cetnikverbände.
7.Verpflichtung Major Lukacevic nicht gegen Mohamedaner vorzugehen. Verpflichtung deutscherseits,mohamedanisches Vorgehen gegen serbische Bevölkerung und Verbände Lukacevic zu verhindern. Bei Zwischenfällen gemeinsame Untersuchung und Befreiung.
8.Austausch von Verbindungsstäben.
9.Lieferung deutscher Munition zur Durchführung gemeinsamer Kampfaufgaben entsprechend militärischen Notwendigkeiten. Vorlage von Stärke, Gliederung und Bewaffnung der Cetnikverbände.
10.Vertrag ist geheimzuhalten.

OB Südost (Okdo. H. Gr. F) Ic C/AO
Nr. 2107/43 gKdos. v. 20.11.43

Translated extracts:

Quote:

2.Cease-fire should be a prerequisite for joint action against the communists.
3.Joint propaganda aginst Communism.
6.Integration of chetnik units in the German command chain during bigger operations.Tasks of the chetniks will be determinted by German command.
8.Exchange of liason staffs.
9.Ammunition for use in joint actions will be supplied according to the military neccesities.Information on strenght,order of battle and weapons of Chetnik groups are to be submitted.

Quote:
Geheime Kommandosache! Ic/AO Nr. 2171/43 g.Kdos.
II. Ang.
H. Qu.,den21.11.1943
Der Oberbefehlshaber
Südost
(OKdo.H.Gr.F)
IC/AO Nr. 2171/43 g.Kdos.1. In Auswirkung der seit längerer Zeit in enger Zusammenarbeit mit dem Sonderbevollmächtigten des Auswärtigen Amtes und OB. Südost geführten Verhandlungen mit Führern von Cetnikverbänden wurde ein Abkommen geschlossen, das örtlich begrenzte Waffenruhe und fallweise zu treffende gemeinsame Kampfführung gegen den Kommunismus vorsieht.
2.Voraussetzung für dieses Abkommen war es und wird es bei möglichen weiteren Abkommen sein, daß die Cetnikverbände
a)sich aller Kampf- und Sabotagehandlungen gegen die deutsche Wehrmacht, deren Verbündete, die mit diesen gemeinsam kämpfenden landeseigenen Verbände und die Muselmanen enthalten,
b)bei Teilnahme an gemeinsamen Kampfhandlungen gegen die Kommunisten sich der deutschen Führung unterstellen,
c)alle Verbindungen zu den mit Deutschland im Kriege stehenden Mächten aufgeben und vorhandene Verbindungsstäbe ausliefern,
d)sich an einer gemeinsamen Propaganda gegen denKommunismus beteiligen.
3.Sämtliche Offiziere sind über folgendes zu unterrichten:
a) Das bisherige Verbot einer Zusammenarbeit mit den Cetnikverbänden und einzelnen Banden entsprach der eindeutigen Festlegung des Obersten Cetnik führers Draga Mihajlovic auf unabdingbaren Kampf gegen Deutschland und seine Verbündeten,von dem dieser sich bisher nicht losgesagt hat.
b)Die Erklärung einzelner Cetnikführer, den Kampf gegen den Kommunismus gemeinsam mit der deutschenWehrmacht führen zu wollen, kam der Gesamtbeurteilung der Feindlage im Südostraum, die das kommunistische Bandenunwesen und seine nachweisbare ideelle und materielle Unterstützung durch die UdSSR als Hauptgefahr erkannt hat, entgegen und mußte demnach zu einer Überprüfung der Cetnik-Angebote führen.
c)Die neuerdings loyale Einstellung einzelner Cetnik-verbände kann nicht verallgemeinert werden, da auch heute noch Überfälle und Sabotageakte durch Cetnik-Banden ausgeführt werden.
d)Der Truppe sind weiterhin Verhandlungen mit Cetnikverbänden verboten.Eigenmächtigkeiten können nur die von höchster politischer und militärischer Stelle
aus angebahnten Verbindungen stören und damit schwere Nachteile für die Gesamtführung im Südost Raum zur Folge haben.
e)Örtliche Cetnikführer, die sich zu gemeinsamem Kampf anbieten, sind an die nächstliegende Dienststelle der Abwehr oder des SD zu verweisen.
f)Die Propaganda gegen die Cetnik-Bewegung wird eingestellt, ihre Wiederaufnahme ist abhängig von der Entwicklung der neugeschaffenen Lage.

gez. Frhr. von Weichs Generalfeldmarschall

Translation:

Quote:
1.As a result of the long negotiations that the “OB Südost” and “Sonderbevollmächtigten des Auswärtigen Amtes” had with the commanders of chetnik groups,the agreement has been made,which provides local cease-fire and occasional joint action against Communism.2.Prerequiste for this agreement was,and for eventual future agreements will be that the Chetniks:
a) will refrain from all combat- and sabotage acts against Germans,their allies,friendly domestic forces and Muslims;
b) will stand under German command in joint actions against the communists;
c) will severe all connections with the countries in war with Germany and will deliver all present liason staffs of those countries;
d) will co-operate in the joint propaganda against the communists;

3.All officers are to be informed of the following:
a) Up untill now the co-operation with the chetniks was forbidden because of Draza Mihailovic´s unalterable insistance to fight the Germans and their allies; up until now,he hasn´t apostized such a stand;
b) Declaration of some chetnik commanders that they would fight the Communism jointly with the German Wehrmacht complied with the general evaluation of the enemy position in the South-east: USSR-sponsored communist bands are the biggest danger. That’s why the offers made by chetniks had to be re-evaluated;
c) Newly loyal attitude of the some chetnik groups should not be taken as a general attiude: sabotage and attacks are still perpetuated by the chetnik bands;
d) The troops are still forbidden to negotiate with the chetniks. Arbitrary acts can only jeopardise already initiated conntacts made by the highest military and political posts. Such actions can only bring serious disadvantages in the whole South-east;
e) Local chetnik commanders who offer co-operation,are to be taken to the nearest SD or Abwehr post;
f) Propaganda against the chetniks is to cease; the results of the current developents will decide if it is to be re-introduced.

sign. Frhr. von Weichs Generalfeldmarschall

Quote:
November 23rd,1943According to a trustworthy source,Mihailovic has ordered his commanders to co-operate with the Germans. He himself can not step forward in such a fashion because of the impact such move could have on populace’s disposition.

KTB OKW b.6/II,p.1304

Quote:
December 17th,1943Lecture notices on

the deployment of chetnik commander Djurisic,who fell into German captivity in mid-May,and who should now organise his earlier followers for the co-operation with Germany.

KTB OKW b.6/II,p.1366

Quote:
December 22nd,1943The Head of the POW section >”Chef des Kriegsgefangenenwesens”< should make an inquiry about 1300 former followers of the Montenegrin chetnik leader Djurisic(who should co-operate with Germany in Montenegro) and report on their behaviour so far,because their use for a special action is being considered.

KTB OKW b.6/II,p.1379

Extracts from a draft titled “Die Entwicklung im Südosten vom 1.April-31.Dezember 1944″ which was compiled in November 1944 using the documents of Wehrmacht Führungstab and KTB; to be found in “KTB OKW”,p.632-732.

Quote:
As in fall of 1943 Tito´s movement grew stronger,supported by Russian and English help and as Mihailovic movement was being pushed into Serbia (and aditionaly weakend by non-existence of Italian support) ,Mihailovic realised that the time has come to re-examine his attitude to the Germans. As the German leadership in the same time was striving to unite and activate all of the anti-communist forces in the South-east (for which a Sp. envoy for South-east,Dr. Neubacher,has been appointed in October 1943),the contacts were made and in the next two months a series of cease-fire agreements was made between German military posts and Mihailovic´s commanders. He refrained from personal involvement,mostly because he didn´t want to lose the Anglo-American arms shippments,which he still received,no matter how smaller than before. Anyway the actions by Mihailovic´s organisation against the Germans stopped.
This lead to a marked improvement of situation >”Entspannung”< in the Old Serbia around the new year.

KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.637

Quote:
…Possibly under impression made by these German counter-measures,Mihailovic-this time personaly-tried to make conntact with German posts,at the end of March-beggining of April. According to the information the Sp.envoy had,Mihailovic was faced with an ultimatum by the exile-government and the Soviets,in which his subordination to Tito was demanded.Sp. envoy was expecting that Mihailovic,faced with unacceptable requests,would try to approach Nedic,i.e. the occupation forces. In agreement with Sp.envoy Neubacher, OB Südost showed no interest for a new round of negotiations,mostly because of what was in the background: Uncertainty toward the Allies,recognition of inferiority to Tito and the unsettled relation to the Nedic´s government.

KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.640-641

Quote:
…So,the operation got bigger and more important for both sides;and a new factor has arrisen,namely the involvement of Serbian chetniks.They formed a strong battle group,allegedly under the command of Mihailovic himself,and went into combat against the “eastern group” of the Communist forces which were advancing from Dreiländer-Ecke >Bosnia,Montenegro,Sandzak< to the north-west. (Lagebuch 29.4.).

KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.651

Quote:
…The Führer approved of the plan,although it would cause new wave of unrest and would make troubles to the German leadership in the South-east, which was employing more and more Orthodox-chetnik groups and had good experience with them.

KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.703

Quote:
During the month of May, the action of Djurisic in Montenegro which had made a promising start,took a sharp turn;at the middle of the month it had to be considered as a failure.According to the report made by the representative of the Foreign ministry in Cetinje,and related by OB Südost, several things stood in the way of succeseful usage of still strong domestic forces (including the chetniks) against the communists: absence of a definite goal,minimum of material support and the most important: the lack of a clear military leadership;the domestic groups were split in divisonal commandos,the Feldkommandatur and the police.

KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.708

Quote:
During the defense against the incursion of the Red divisions in March,April and May,Serbian units proved themselves well, notably the Serbisches Freiwilligen Korps but also more or less illegal groups of Chetniks,allegedly under the personal command of Mihailovic.

KTB OKW,b,7/I,p.706

Quote:
The Serbian Chetniks and Draza Mihailovic,who (along from Ustasha and EDES) were the only serious anti-communist movement in the South-east,were biding their time during the summer and were occasionaly willing to negotiate. Tense situation existed in their relations to Nedic government,whose power grew stronger (connected to the strengthening of SFK).In order to make the recruitment harder,they took reprisals against the inhabitants.OB South-east,in this context hinted again at the Dr. Neubacher’s propostion on strengthening the Nedic government. However,as the Allied offensive was opened,as the Turkey changed sides,as Bulgaria changed it’s attitude and as Tito’s forces appeared to be endangering the German positions n the South-east,Mihailovic and Nedic started to approach each other and to seek contacts with the Germans.This fact had a thoroughgoing meaning. Up until now the German leadship thought that in a moment when the occupation force gets into trouble,all the uprising movements would join hands and call for a general uprising.Now it showed that-quoted in the OB order dated 2nd of August-“Draza Mihailovic,as well as leaders of all other bands believe that (on the basis of a general situation) the invader is the Enemy nr.2; Enemy nr.1 became Communism at home and abroad.”

On August 17th (OB message of August 20th) Nedic offered the unification of all Serbian forces for the defense of communist-endangered Serbdom.He underlined that he was officialy speaking for Mihailovic too,after the meeting they had.He asked for a immediate shippment of 3 million small-arms rounds and a approval for creating of a 50,000 strong Serbian army made mostly of Mihailovic’s units. OB South-east,after consulting with Mil.Bef. Suedsot,quickly reached a conclusion that a turning down this offer meant antagonising all of the Serbs,new Tito’s succeses,cuting all the comunications (especially to Greece) and to the stopping of economical exploitation.

KTB OKW,b,7/I,p.709

Quote:
During the visit to the FHQ on August 22nd,GFM v. Weichs pointed out the fact that with further advance ot Tito and the awaited pull-out of Bulgarian Occupation Corps,the situation in Serbia will grow worse,and that the forces at hand won’t be up to it.Chetniks,who in the period March-August lost 5,000 men fighting the communists are lately not hostile towards the Germans….8-10,000 of them are curently fighting the communists alongside the German forces in Southern Serbia under German major Weyel.The Mihailovic-Nedic agreement means unification of all Serbs and 90% support of the people…He proposed the forming of three regiments from proven chetniks, 6,000 men in all,for which necessary weapons should be shipped and officers sent to provide German leadership…

Quote:
…Fuehrer’s decission was relayed by teleprinter >“Fernschriftlich“<:Only single,proven chetnik groups are to be placed under German control and command for use in tacticaly small local actions.

KTB OKW,b,7/I,p.710

Quote:
As Serbia quickly became eastern front of the OB Suedost,and as Tito-forces advanced from the west,the chetniks continued seeking contections with the Germans;some even offered hostages. In the same time,they were showing their dissapointment with small or non-existent arms shippments…

Quote:
…At the end of September,resistance notwithstanding,chetniks were pushed out of important parts of Serbia.Only those who stuck closely with German forces held out. >“soweit sie sich nicht eng an die deutsche Wehrmacht anlehnten“<

KTB OKW,b,7/I,p.711

Following lines are translated from “Das Ende auf dem Balkan”:Die Operationen der Heeresgruppe E von Griechenland bis zu den Alpen”,Kurt Vowinckel Verlag,Heidelberg 1955, by Erich Schmidt-Richberg >He was the Chieff of staff of HG “E” from 3/15/44<

Quote:
It is known that the German attitude towards the chetniks changed several times.As Tito and the communists finaly gained the upper hand in the Yugoslav Resistance,chetniks and Germans reached some kind of neutrality arrangement. This arrangement was not strongly adherred to by the chetniks;apart from that,it lead to troubles with the Croats.The OB of HG “E” had to take a clear stand in regard to disputes between various Yugoslav groups.The interests and mentality of the Croats came in the first place,because the OB had to work with them in the future. Directives on the troops had to be clear and simple. OB reminded on their unreliability and has forbidden offical pacting with the chetniks,as well as supporting them with arms and ammunition.Envoys were to be sent to the OB. It was percieved that only local arrangements with “Heimat-Cetniks” were advantageous.These guidelines payed off.Ccourse of events from the near past played a role in forming of the attitude of the OB. Not so long time ago have chetniks attacked an SS column east of Sarajevo,causing hundred deaths. The attitude of chetniks from Ibar valley (some of them were present near Krusevac when Col. v.d. Chevallerie was captured) and Novipazar was unclear. The night attack on a German company-sized (altough of weak combat strength) column on the old Turkish road Mitrovica-Novipazar was probably made by the chetniks. However,it is not ruled out that the attcak was made by partisans who were sppoted around Tutin,where they promptly retreated.

p.55-56

Quote:
The leader of the chetniks ,this nationalistic Serbian resistance movement,Draza Mihailovic was in Vares. In his name general Trifunovic demanded the right to use the Drina crossings at Gorazde;he was turned down. Later,a large number of his men gradualy made it across the river.Anticipated directive of OB came >”Es sei noch vorweggenommen dass bald der Auftrag von OB kam…”< ,which instructed the handing out of ammunition to the chetniks. The V.SS Corps then pointed out that the chetniks ambushed their column,causing 100 deaths.Apart from that,own units were low on ammunition,so the handing out was hardly possible. It was basicaly percieved that the co-operation with this group could hardly yield any more advantages. Old distrust towards the chetniks,Croat enemy nr.1, could not be overcome. This caused the OB to order that chetniks are to be supported only localy.

p.83

Quote:
General Geiger,the commander of Doboj,had on his disposal two battalions of the 7.SS divisio,one Flak battalion,local Railway Security troops,detachments from passing-by troops,Domobran division,1000 rifles,still in organisation and another 1000 ustashas. Loose connection was held with chetniks on the Ozren mountain and in Trebovac.They were supported in a very modest way by supplying medical supplies and rifle ammunition.

p.111

Quote:
December 14th,1942Serbia:
In the zone of the 704. inf. divison one unreliable chetnik group was disarmed.

KTB OKW,b.4/II,p.1136

Quote:
December 17th,1942Croatia:
Eastern Bosnia: Unreliable chetnik group was disarmed.

KTB OKW,b.4/II,p.1150

Following extracts are from KTB OKW,band 7/I,p.732-756. Original document is named “Kroatien (unter militärischen Gesichtspunkten) im Jahr 1944″, compiled from “Akten of WFStab and “Merkbuch”:

Quote:
Croatians repeated protests over the use of chetnik groups by the Wehrmacht in Dalmatia. Führer responded they are only dissarmed Hiwis or that the arangements are made only with small groups; There are no chetnik commanders from Serbia proper in Dalmatia,and these groups represent no threat to the Croatian state….>Meeting between Hitler and “Croatian ministers” in FHQ on March 1st 1944<

KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.739

Quote:
…Mixing even of smallest groups of orthodox chetniks with Croatian citizenship with the troops is not a practical idea,for various reasons. Attachment of single loyal groups (term “Chetnik” is to be ommited) to German units was proposed…>Message of OB Südost of April 25th 1944<

KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.743

Quote:
On September 1st came a directive to both OB Südost and Deutscher Bev. Gen. to proceed against fraternization with the chetniks and to enforce earlier Führer’s orders on this matter.

KTB OKW,b.7/I,p.751
Extracts from the report Wilchelm Hoettl (after the war wrote the book “Geheime Front” under the pseudonym Walther Haagel) of the SD sent to Edmund Glaise von Horstenau in March 1945.Document is quoted in Vasa Kazimirovic,”Njemacki general u Zagrebu”,Kragujevac-Beograd 1996.,p.309-310. Original is to be found in Kriegsarchiv Wien,B-67,nr.101.

Quote:
During the preparations for a certain operation in Serbia,liason officer to the group which was to take part in this operation had a conversation with Draza Mihailovic.Conversation went on in especially friendly atmosphere. DM found out that the plan of the group fits good in his own plans-fight against communism-so he promised all the necessary help.
DM said that,appart from increased activity of his forces in Serb arrea, he plans to reorganize his troops in western Bosnia and launch an attack on Serbia in the right moment. He is of the opinion that this move should be synchronised with the advance by German army in the Balkans,in which case Old Serbia should be made his arrea of operations……As for propaganda against the common enemy,he purposed a settinng up of a secret radio-station,adding that Nedic’s stations don’t have the desired impact on Serbian people…

…Having all this in mind,it can be said that DM’s intentions are honest…

…DM’s idea of setting up a radio-station should be considered.He purposed that the impression should be made,as though the station is operating from within Serbia.Impact of such an arrangement should be twofold: first,it should influence effectively the Serbian population (unlike Nedic’s station) and it should create the feeling of unconfort among Serbia’s current masters.”

Extract from the letter written by German soldier Erasmus von Jakimow (March 15th 1918,Skopin-November 17th 1944,at Albertfalu on Danube),dated October 31st 1944:

Quote:
“The Situation in the Balkans seems to be changing-for better or for worse,who could tell?…The English seem to have dropped Dalmatia-Montenegro,Chetniks have broken and fled >laufen auseinander<,some to us,but most to Tito.It became clear :it’s White against Red now.

Quoted from:Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,Hans Dollinger “Der zweite Weltkrieg in Bildern und Dokumenten”,Wiesbaden,3.Band,p.189

Quote:
“Attempt of the 342. ID to advance in the territory held by the uprisers,on both banks of upper Drina has failed.Losses were light mostly because of Dangic’s orders on his men not to fight the German troops…”

Ladislaus Hory und Martin Broszat,“Der Kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941-1945″,p.119,reference to “Bericht des deutschen Kriegsverwaltungschef SS-Gruppenfuehrer Turner vom 16.2.1942 an Himmler;Pers.Stab RFSS,Inst f. Zeitgesch. MA 328,Bl. 651814 ff.

Quote:
“Bands operating in Eastern Bosnia also involve,apart from Communists,chetnik bands of the former Col.Mihailovic and Major Jezdimir Dangic…Dangic doesn’t want to fight the Wehrmacht and according to the Bericht des Bevoellmaechtigten Komandierenden Generals in Serbien written on 5th of February,this was proved on the field…Major Dangic has made following proposals in the negotiations in Belgrade:
He is willing to secure Eastern Bosnia with his chetniks under following conditions:1.)that all Ustasha withdraw from this area;
2.)that the Germans army takes over the area ;
3.)that the Croatian administration apparatus be made of Serbs,Croats and Muslims.

Based on the former,negotiations were conducted by Komandierenden General in consultation with German ambassador in Zagreb and with Croatian government.They failed because of the objections of the Croatian government,which would not tolerate such reductions to the state’s souverenity;Komandierende General who would not act without their consent,broke off the talks.”

Ibidem,s.119-120.Reference to “Bericht des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD an Reichsfuehrer-SS am 17.Februar 1942″,PA/AA,Buero RAM:Kroatien 1941/1942,Bl.442-449.

Quote:
“Whole border between Serbia and Bosnia on the Drina with Visegrad is secured by German and Croatian troops.In the area east of Sarajevo,even the Serbian refugees started to come back to their homes.In the area of Ozren (north of Sarajevo),Croats achieved trough the negotiations that 13 chetnik batallions,though week,placed themselves in the service of the Croatian state >”in Verhandlungen erreicht worden,dass…dem kroatischen Staat unterstellt” hätten.<

Ibidem,s.128.Reference to “Telegramme Kasches vom 15. und 30.5.42;PA/AA,Buero Sts:Kroatien,Bd.3,Bl.89f. und 107.

“As Croat general Franjo Simic was killed on 9th of August 1943,apparently by Chetniks…have the Croatian students published the following leaflet:”

Quote:
“The Chetniks,those perfidious snakes and criminals,have pacted in the past with the Italians.Now they do it with the Germans…We ask from the Germans to stop tolerating and supporting the Chetniks who are their worst foes…Chetniks and Croats must not and will not have the same allies…Death and revenge to the Chetniks!Long live the Croatian state!

Ibidem,s.165-166.Reference to the “German translation of the leaflet by Embassy secretary v.Schubert,presented to Ambassador Kasche on 12.8.1944;PA/AA,Gesandschaft Zagreb:Bd.67/4,Bl.56 ff.

“At the end of September 1944 German commander of Split arrested the Ustashi-leader of the town in reprisal for Ustashi actions against the chetniks who were allied to the Wehrmacht,threatening to

Quote:
“…shoot five Ustashis for every Chetnik.”

Ibidem,s.166.Reference to:“Telegramme des Stabchefs der Ustascha-Miliz,Oberst Herencic,von Ende September 1944;PA/AA,Gesandschaft Zagreb:Bd.67/4,Bl.75f.

Extract from the note by v. Weichs on Mihailovic:

Quote:
“Though he himself shrewdly refrained from giving his personal view in public,no doubt to have a free hand for every eventuality (e.g. Allied landing on the Balkans),he allowed his commanders to negotiate with the Germans and to co-operate with them.And they did it,more and more…”

Werner Roehr (zusammengestellt),“Europa unterm Hakenkreuz-Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938-1945),1994,s.358;reference to “Johann Wuescht,”Jugoslawien und das Dritte Reich.Eine dokumentierte Geschichte der deutsch-jugoslawischen Beziehungen von 1933-1945″,1969,s.64

The following lines come from Klaus Schmider,”Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien”,Hamburg;Berlin;Bonn 2002.

“The ten-day report of the Commanding General states even that the Chetniks

Quote:
“have proven themselves in co-operation with German Wehrmacht better than the Croatian Army units.”

Schmider,p.134; BA/MA, RH 26-114/12 10-Tage Meldung fuer die Zeit vom 11.9.-20.9.42 (20.9.1942)

“So,for instance in context of fighting around Prozor and defence of Konjic.At the end of the operation came Lueters to the following conclusion:

Quote:
“The divisions that took part in “Weiss II” gave consistent reports >”aeusserten sich uebereinstimmend”< on the good conduct of Chetnik units.Trough scouting and relieving attacks they have helped our troops,all that without asking for German support in any way.”

ibidem,p.232,footnote 179; BA/MA, RH 24-15/2 Bfh. d. dt. Tr. i. Kroat.,Ia-Lagebeurteilung fuer die Zeit vom 1.3.-15.3.43 (16.3.43.)

Quote:
“In the future,ammunition will be handed out only to those Chetnik units who under German command fight the Partisans.”

ibidem,p.187; BA/MA, RH 26-118/32 Befehl and die Cetnikfuehrer Cvijetin Todic,Golub Mitrovic,Savo Derikonja,Radivoj Kosoric,Bozo Plemic und Dusan Kovacevic (12.1.43).

Quote:
“Partly,the Serbs have futhermore showed themselves as the most reliable allies in fighting against the red bands,that is against communism.They are always ready to fight against the bandits with the German Wehrmacht and even to place themselves under it’s command”

ibidem,p.307;BA/MA, RH 24-15/10 SS-Freiw.-Div. “Prinz Eugen” an Gen.Kdo. XV.Geb.AK. (5.9.1943).

“In the few weeks that have passed since the division moved into this region formerly occupied by the Italians,the Chetniks have made themselves indespensible at securing the supply routes (especially the Knin-Drnis railroad). If Djuic would be arrested at this moment ,said Egleser, it would mean the troops would have to

Quote:
“fight constantly for their own supplies.”

ibidem,p.308; BA/MA, RH 24-15/6 114.Jaegerdivision,Abt. Ic an Gen.Kdo. XV.Geb.AK (4.10.43).

“So,it doesn’t surprise that the words

Quote:
“Armed support of the brave Chetniks”

were openly said at a “Chefbeschprechung” in Thesaloniki on 1st of March.”

ibidem,p.232; BA/MA ,RH 19 VII/7 Aktennotiz ueber die Chefbeschprechung am 1.3.1943 (1.3.1943).

Following lines were written by Edmund Glaise von Horstenau in his diary:

Quote:
“The units that could really be used against the partisans were the Serbian and partly the Russian volunteers and-Draza Mihailovic’s people.My liason officer with them was a certain major,Ritterkreuztraeger.”

>written on situation in Serbia during his visit to Belgrade in June 1944.<

Peter Broucek,”Ein General in Zwielicht;Errinerungen Edmund Glaises von Horstenau”,Wien-Koeln-Graz,1988; p.421

Quote:
“Using the general situation in which Mihailovic found himself,we made local agreements with various chetnik groups.”

>written on situation in Croatia at the beginning of 1944.<

ibidem,p.352

Quote:
“In the meanwhile, single groups which are found to be suitable to be our partners in the fighting against the partisans can be, from case to case, supplied with ammunition. Written commitments on the part of the Wehrmacht are, in every case, not to be made.”

Klaus Schmider,”Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslawien”,Hamburg;Berlin;Bonn 2002, p.492 ; PA/AA, SbvollSO R 27303 Neubacher an Kramarz (21.3.1944)

Quote:
“Every support provided by the occupying power is to be canceled until further notice, even to the DM chetniks who are fighting the communism.”

ibidem, p.495; BA/MA, RW 40/88 Tagesmeldung vom 27.5.1944.

Quote:
“Until the clarification of the newly developed situation and it’s possible impact, we will distance ourselves from the DM camp, with the only exception of the joint fight against the red partisans, which developed in the field.”

ibidem, p.497; PA/AA, SbvollSO R 27301 Neubacher an Junker (22.5.1944)

Quote:
“With offers made by D.M. movement, the handing-over of the enemy spies (Englishmen) should be asked for. Those who wish to return with their arms, should be helped on their way back home. DM-units should be bound not to undertake any hostile activities against the German Wehrmacht and it’s allies and to return German prisoners. They should also pledge to fight the communists in certain areas, supervised by a German liason officer.”

ibidem,p.472-473; BA/MA, RW 40/82 KTB-Eintrag vom 1.11.1943

Quote:
“DM has repeatedly tried to make contact with us” >”…mit uns ins Gespraech zu kommen.”<

ibidem,p.488; BA/MA, RW 40/86 Militaerbefehlshaber Suedost, Abt. Ia, Lagebericht fuer die Zeit vom 16.2-15.3.1944 (25.3.1944)

Quote:
“Important duty of the Pz.AOK 2 and Mil.Bhf.Suedost is to bring all of the chetniks in Serbia and Montenegro to battle with the red forces and keep them engaged, so that they can’t act on their own initiative. This initiative, if allowed, could result in action against Germany, given the general situation.”

ibidem,p.510; BA/MA, RH 19 XI/28 OB Suedost an Pz.AOK 2 (26.8.1944)

Quote:
“Gen.Lt. Winter has determined that is important to realise, that the arms D.M. is asking for are not available.”

ibidem,p.517; BA/MA, RH 19 XI/18 Gruppe Ic/AO, Aktennotiz zur Beschprechung am 29.9.1944 (30.8.1944)
“As the Germans tired to have three of their V-maenner >three out of 70 chetniks the NDH powers had arrested after the Otok massacre< freed, came to considerable tension between the Germans and the Croats. Leader of the “Abwehrstelle” in Split commented…:”

Quote:
“We cannot abandon the only allies (chetniks) we have in this cursed country >Sauland< (Croatia).”

ibidem,p.373; PA/AA. Inland IIg 401, 2824 Kasche an Auswaertiges Amt (16.4.1944)

Quote:
“Chetniks are the only useful fellow combatants”

ibidem,p.378; BA/MA, RH 19 XI/15 Erfahrungsbericht ueber Dienstreise Serbien-Kroatien in der Zeit vom 20.6-4.7.1944 (5.7.1944)

Quote:
“Chetniks (…) our natural allies. Only they are fighting! “Kroatische Kampfgemeinschaft” exists only on paper.”

ibidem,p.378; BA/MA, RH 19 XI/29 OKW/WfSt, Gruppe Ic/Ao Vortragsnotiz fuer Aussenchefbeschprechung am 25.7.1944 (23.7.1944)